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Abstract
We generalize the null player property (satisﬁed by the Shapley value) and nullifying player
property (satisﬁed by the equal division solution) to the so-called δ-reducing player prop-
erty, stating that a δ-reducing player (being a player such that any coalition containing this
player earns a fraction δ ∈ [0, 1] of the worth of that coalition without that player) earns
a zero payoﬀ. This property yields the null player property for δ = 1 and the nullifying
player property for δ = 0. We show that eﬃciency, symmetry, linearity and this δ-reducing
player property characterizes the corresponding δ-discounted Shapley value. Moreover, we
provide a strategic implementation of these solutions where δ is a discount factor that
determines the decrease in value to be distributed in the next round after the proposal is
rejected and the remaining players (without the proposer) play a new round of bidding.
Keywords: Cooperative TU-game, Shapley value, equal division solution, δ-discounted
Shapley value, Axiomatization, Implementation, Discounting
JEL code: C71; C72
AMS subject classification: 91A12; 91A10
1 Introduction
Recently, several solutions that make a trade-oﬀ between marginalism and egalitarianism
in cooperative TU-games have been developed such as the egalitarian Shapley values, be-
ing convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution (see Joosten
(1996)), and the (generalized) consensus values, being convex combinations of the Shapley
value and the CIS-value (see Ju, Borm and Ruys (2007))1. Although in all these solutions
the Shapley value is the most marginalistic solution (see also Young (1985)), there are
diﬀerent possibilities with respect to the most egalitarian solution2. In van den Brink, Fu-
naki and Ju (2007) it is shown that all egalitarian Shapley values have Sobolev’s reduced
game consistency (see Sobolev (1973)) in common, and diﬀer only with respect to a stan-
dardness for two-player games. Such a standardness axiom requires that in a two-player
game both players get a fraction of their singleton worth, and the remainder is split equally
among them. The fraction of their singleton worth that the players can keep for themselves
determines the weight put on the Shapley value.
Another comparison of the Shapley value and the equal division solution is made by
van den Brink (2007) who considers several axiomatizations of the Shapley value and shows
that replacing an axiom concerning null players (i.e. players whose marginal contribution
to any coalition is zero) by a similar axiom concerning nullifying players (i.e. players
whose presence in a coalition implies the coalition earns zero worth) characterizes the equal
division solution. For example, in the original axiomatization of the Shapley value (see
Shapley (1953)) by eﬃciency, the null player property, symmetry and additivity, replacing
the null player property (which states that null players get a zero payoﬀ) by the nullifying
player property (which states that nullifying players get a zero payoﬀ) characterizes the
equal division solution3. In the underlying paper we want to make a trade-oﬀ between
marginalism and egalitarianism by taking a combination of these two properties. In other
words, we deﬁne a particular type of player to whom we assign a zero payoﬀ. For δ ∈ [0, 1]
a player i is called a δ-reducing player in a game if any coalition containing this player earns
a fraction δ of the worth of that coalition without player i. Then the δ-reducing player
property states that such a player gets a zero payoﬀ. Clearly, δ = 1 implies that player i’s
marginal contributions are all zero, and thus yields the null player property of the Shapley
value. On the other hand, δ = 0 implies that the worth of any coalition containing player
i is zero, and thus this yields the nullifying player property.
1The CIS-value, or equal surplus division solution, assigns to every TU-game the Center of the Imputa-
tion Set, i.e. every player gets its singleton worth and the remaining surplus is distributed equally among
the players, and is discussed in Driessen and Funaki (1991).
2Diﬀerent egalitarian solutions are compared in van den Brink and Funaki (2009).
3A similar result can be obtained for the CIS-value or equal surplus division solution.
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It turns out that replacing the null or nullifying player property (in the axiomatiza-
tions of the Shapley value, respectively, equal division solution) by this δ-reducing player
property yields the corresponding δ-discounted Shapley value as considered in Joosten
(1996) and Driessen and Radzik (2002). This class contains both the Shapley value and
the equal division solution as extreme cases. However, for δ ∈ (0, 1) this solution is not a
convex combination of the Shapley value and the equal division solution, and thus this class
is diﬀerent from the class of egalitarian Shapley values. From Joosten (1996, Proposition
5.32) (see also Driessen and Radzik (2002)), it follows that all δ-discounted Shapley values
satisfy Hart and Mas-Colell’s reduced game consistency (see Hart and Mas-Colell (1988,
1989)). In fact, he shows that for any δ ∈ [0, 1] the corresponding solution is characterized
by HM-consistency and the corresponding δ-standardness for two player games.
Following Nash (1953), besides axiomatizations a second approach to characterize
solutions is to ﬁnd non-cooperative (strategic) implementations of these solutions. Our
second characterization of the discounted Shapley values concerns such a strategic im-
plementation. The bidding mechanism (extensive form game) which implements these
solutions generalizes the one for the Shapley value given in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2001), diﬀering only in the fact that we allow for discounting in the available surplus to
be dirstibuted. Assuming that after each rejection of the proposal the amount available to
be distributed among the remaining players in the next round is discounted by parameter
δ ∈ [0, 1], this modiﬁcation of the mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) yields
the corresponding δ-discounted Shapley value as the payoﬀ distribution in any subgame
perfect equilibrium of this game.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries on TU-games and
solutions. In Section 3 we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the δ-discounted
Shapley values. Besides the original axiomatization of Shapley (1953) we also adapt the
characterizations of Young (1985) and Chun (1992) for this class4. Section 4 provides a
strategic implementation. Finally, Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
A situation in which a ﬁnite set of players can obtain certain payoﬀs by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, being
a pair (N, v), where N ⊂ IN is a ﬁnite set of players and v: 2N → R is a characteristic
function on N such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is called the worth of
coalition S. This is the transferable utility that the members of coalition S can obtain by
4These already have been adapted for the equal division solution in van den Brink (2007).
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agreeing to cooperate. We denote the class of all TU-games by G. A TU-game (N, v) is
monotone if v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T ⊆ N . The unanimity game of coalition T ⊆ N ,
T 
= ∅, on N is the game (N,uT ) given by
uT (S) =
{
1 if T ⊆ S
0 otherwise.
The standard game of coalition T ⊆ N , T 
= ∅, on N is the game (N, bT ) given by
bT (S) =
{
1 if T = S,
0 otherwise.
It is well-known that every game can be expressed as a unique linear combination of
unanimity games as v =
∑
T⊆N
T =∅
∆v(T )uT with ∆v(T ) =
∑
S⊆T (−1)
|T |−|S|v(S) the Harsanyi
dividends (see Harsanyi 1959)). Similar, every game can be expressed as a unique linear
combination of standard games by v =
∑
T⊆N
T =∅
v(T )bT .
In the sequel we denote n = |N | for the number of players in N . For generic
coalitions S, T ⊆ N we denote s = |S| and t = |T |.
A payoff vector of game (N, v) is an n-dimensional real vector x ∈ IRn which rep-
resents a distribution of the payoﬀs that can be earned by cooperation over the individual
players. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games is a function ψ which assigns a payoﬀ
vector ψ(N, v) ∈ Rn to every TU-game (N, v) ∈ G such that ψi({i}, v) = v({i}) for all
i ∈ IN. Two well-known solutions are the Shapley value and the equal division solution.
The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) is the solution that assigns to every TU-game (N, v)
the payoﬀ vector
Shi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
mSi (v),
where for every i ∈ S and S ⊆ N \ {i}
mSi (v) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)
is the marginal contribution of player i to coalition S.
The equal division solution is the solution that distributes the worth v(N) of the
‘grand coalition’ equally among all players and thus assigns to every TU-game (N, v) the
payoﬀ vector
EDi(N, v) =
v(N)
n
for all i ∈ N.
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Joosten (1996, Chapter 5) introduces two classes of solutions with the Shapley value and
equal division solution as extreme cases. The ﬁrst is the class of egalitarian Shapley val-
ues and consists of all convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division
solution5. Second, for δ ∈ [0, 1], he introduces the solution Shδ given by
Shδi (N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
δn−s−1 (v(S ∪ {i})− δ · v(S)) for all i ∈ N.
Later, these solutions have been called δ-discounted Shapley values by Driessen and Radzik
(2002). Joosten (1996) also showed that all δ-discounted Shapley values satisfy Hart
and Mas-Colell (HM) consistency . Even stonger, he showed that for any δ ∈ [0, 1]
the corresponding δ-discounted Shapley value is characterized by HM-consistency and δ-
standardness for two player games, see Section 5 for details.
Example 2.1 Consider the 3-player unanimity games (N,u{2}) and (N, u{2,3}) on N =
{1, 2, 3}. In these games the payoﬀs of the players are given by Shδ(N, u{2}) = (
2−δ−δ2
6
, 1+δ+δ
2
3
, 2−δ−δ
2
6
)
and Shδ(N, u{2,3}) = (
1−δ
3
, 2+δ
6
, 2+δ
6
). For example, taking δ = 1
2
we obtain Sh
1
2 (N, u{2}) =
1
24
(5, 14, 5) and Sh
1
2 (N, u{2,3}) =
1
12
(2, 5, 5). 
Next we recall some well-known properties of solutions for TU-games. First, we
deﬁne two vectors associated to every player in a TU-game. The marginal vector mi(v) ∈
IR2
n−1
of player i is the vector of marginal contributions of player i to coalitions S ⊆ N \{i},
while the worth vector vi ∈ IR2
n−1
is the vector of worths of coalitions v(S∪{i}), S ⊆ N\{i}.
A player i ∈ N is a null player in (N, v) if mi(v) is the zero vector with all components
equal to zero, i.e. v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N \ {i}. A player i ∈ N is a nullifying
player 6 in (N, v) if vi is the zero vector, i.e. v(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N with i ∈ S. A solution
ψ
• satisﬁes the null player property if ψi(N, v) = 0 whenever i is a null player in (N, v);
• satisﬁes the nullifying player property if ψi(N, v) = 0 whenever i is a nullifying player
in (N, v);
• is efficient7 if
∑
i∈N ψi(N, v) = v(N) for all (N, v) ∈ G;
• is linear if ψ(N,βv + γw) = βψ(N, v) + γψ(N,w) for all (N, v), (N,w) ∈ G and
β, γ ∈ IR, where βv + γw is given by (βv + γw)(S) = βv(S) + γw(S) for all S ⊆ N ;
5For every α ∈ [0, 1], the α-egalitarian Shapley value ϕα is the solution given by ϕα(N, v) = αSh(N, v)+
(1− α)ED(N, v).
6Deegan and Packel (1979) refer to nullifying players as zero players and use this property to characterize
their (non-eﬃcient) Deegan-Packel value.
7Eﬃcient solutions are often called values.
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• is symmetric if ψi(N, v) = ψj(N, v) for all (N, v) ∈ G and i, j ∈ N such that v(S ∪
{i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
In the literature several axiomatizations of the Shapley value can be found. For example,
Shapley (1953) characterizes the Shapley value by eﬃcieny, symmetry, linearity and the
null player property8. Other axiomatizations can be found in, e.g. Young (1985), Chun
(1992) and van den Brink (2001). In van den Brink (2007) it is shown that replacing in
these axiomatizations an axiom concerning null players (such as the null player property)
by a similar axiom concerning nullifying players (such as the nullifying player property)
characterizes the equal division solution.
3 Reducing players: Axiomatization of δ-discounted
Shapley values
We generalize the null- and nullifying player property as follows. For δ ∈ [0, 1] we call
player i ∈ N a δ-reducing player in game (N, v) if v(S ∪ {i}) = δv(S) for all S ⊆ N \ {i}.
So, when player i enters any coalition then the worth of this coalition is a fraction δ of the
worth of the coalition without player i. Clearly, if δ = 1 this implies that the worth of no
coalition changes when i enters, i.e. a 1-reducing player is a null player. When δ = 0 then
the worth of any coalition not containing i becomes zero when i enters, i.e. a 0-reducing
player is a nullifying player. Consequently the following property generalizes the null- as
well as the nullifying player property.
• For δ ∈ [0, 1], solution ψ satisﬁes the δ-reducing player property if ψi(N, v) = 0
whenever i is a δ-reducing player in (N, v).
Next, we show that this axiom together with eﬃciency, symmetry and linearity character-
izes the corresponding δ-discounted Shapley value for every δ ∈ [0, 1]. This follows similar
as axiomatizations of the Shapley value and equal division solution, but using a diﬀerent
basis for TU-games. Consider a ﬁxed player set N . For every T ⊆ N , T 
= ∅, and δ ∈ [0, 1]
we deﬁne the game (N, dδT ) ∈ G by d
δ
T =
∑
S⊆N
T⊆S
δs−tbS, and thus
dδT (S) =
{
δs−t if T ⊆ S
0 otherwise.
Note that the game dδT is the unanimity game uT of coalition T ⊆ N if δ = 1, and it is the
standard game bT of T if δ = 0.
8This axiomatization is more often presented in this way although Shapley (1953) combines eﬃciency
and the null player property into a carrier axiom.
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Lemma 3.1 For every (N, v) ∈ G and δ ∈ [0, 1] there exist unique numbers Dδv(T ) ∈ IR
such that v =
∑
T⊆N
T =∅
Dδv(T )d
δ
T .
Proof
Consider a game (N, v) ∈ G and δ ∈ [0, 1]. Obviously, if T = {i} then Dδv({i}) = v({i})
is uniquely determined since dδ{i} is the only game d
δ
T for which d
δ
T ({i}) 
= 0. Proceed-
ing by induction, suppose that the numbers Dδv(T
′) have been uniquely determined for
any T ′ ⊂ N with |T ′| < |T |. Since the worth of any S ⊆ N can be written as v(S) =∑
H⊆N D
δ
v(H)d
δ
H(S) =
∑
H⊆S D
δ
v(H)d
δ
H(S) = D
δ
v(S)d
δ
S(S)+
∑
H⊂S D
δ
v(H)d
δ
H(S), it follows
with the induction hypothesis and dδT (T ) = 1, thatD
δ
v(T ) =
1
dδ
T
(T )
(
v(T )−
∑
H⊂T D
δ
v(H)d
δ
H(T )
)
is uniquely determined. 
Next, we can state our ﬁrst main result, axiomatizing the δ-discounted Shapley values9.
Theorem 3.2 Take δ ∈ [0, 1]. Solution ψ satisfies efficiency, symmetry, linearity and the
δ-reducing player property if and only if ψ = Shδ.
Proof
It is straightforward to verify that Shδ satisﬁes these axioms. To show uniqueness suppose
that solution ψ satisﬁes the four axioms, and take T ⊂ N, T 
= ∅. We ﬁrst show that every
player i ∈ N \ T is a δ-reducing player in (N, dδT ). Consider S ⊆ N \ {i}. We distinguish
two cases.
(i) Suppose that T 
⊂ S. Then T 
⊂ S ∪ {i}, and thus dδT (S ∪ {i}) = d
δ
T (S) = 0, implying
that dδT (S ∪ {i}) = δd
δ
T (S) for any δ ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) Suppose that T ⊂ S. Then T ⊂ S ∪ {i}, and thus dδT (S) = δ
s−t and dδT (S ∪ {i}) =
δs+1−t, again implying that dδT (S ∪ {i}) = δd
δ
T (S).
Thus, i ∈ N \ T is a δ-reducing player in (N, dδT ).
(The remainder of the proof is similar as that in Shapley (1953), but using the basis dδT
instead of the unanimity basis10.) Consider any (N, v) ∈ G and δ ∈ [0, 1]. Eﬃciency and
symmetry imply that ψi(N, d
δ
N) =
1
n
for all i ∈ N .
Now, let T ⊂ N . The δ-reducing player property implies that ψi(N, dδT ) = 0 for all
i ∈ N \T . Eﬃciency then implies that
∑
i∈T ψi(N, d
δ
T ) =
∑
i∈N ψi(N, d
δ
T ) = d
δ
T (N) = δ
n−t.
Thus, with symmetry it follows that ψi(N, d
δ
T ) =
δn−t
t
for all i ∈ T . Uniqueness for arbitrary
9We remark that the results in this section hold if we restrict ourselves to the class of all TU-games on
a ﬁxed player set N .
10Similar, van den Brink (2007) used the standard basis for characterizing the equal division solution.
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(N, v) ∈ G follows since linearity of ψ and the fact that v =
∑
T⊆N
T =∅
Dδv(T )d
δ
T (see Lemma
3.1) imply that ψi(N, v) =
∑
T⊆N
T =∅
Dδv(T )ψi(N, d
δ
T ) =
∑
T⊆N
i∈T
Dδv(T )
δn−t
t
for all i ∈ N . 
Note that the δ-reducing player property can be reformulated by saying that a player
i ∈ N gets a zero payoﬀ if the convex combination δmi(v) + (1 − δ)vi of the marginal
vector mi(v) ∈ IR2
n−1
and the worth vector vi ∈ IR2
n−1
of player i is the zero vector. So,
instead of taking convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution
(as in egalitarian Shapley values), taking convex combinations of the marginal vector (used
in characterizing the Shapley value) and the worth vector (used in characterizing the equal
division solution) in specifying a type of player that gets a zero payoﬀ, yields a class of
solutions that has the Shapley value and equal division solution as extreme cases, but are
not convex combinations of these two solutions.
We want to stress the diﬀerence between the δ-reducing player property and δ-
egalitarianism in Joosten (1996) or the quasi-dummy property in Ju, Borm and Ruys
(2007). Whereas the latter two properties adapt the null player property by stating what
a null player should get, with the δ-reducing player property we specify a type of player
that gets a zero payoﬀ (like null players according to the null player property and nullifying
players according to the nullifying player property). Of course, we could also characterize
the class of δ-discounted Shapley values Shδ using a property similar to δ-egalitarianism
or the quasi-dummy property by specifying what is earned by null players. (The obvious
proof is omitted.)
Proposition 3.3 If i ∈ N is a null player in (N, v) ∈ G then
Shδi (N, v) = (1− δ)
∑
S⊆N\{i}
δn−s−1
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
v(S).
Note that the δ-discounted Shapley value Shδ(N, v) can be rewritten as
Shδi (N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
S =∅
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
δn−s−1 (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)) +
∑
S⊆N\{i}
S =∅
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
δn−s−1(1− δ)v(S) for all i ∈ N.
From this it follows directly that all payoﬀs are nonnegative if the game is monotone.
Proposition 3.4 If (N, v) ∈ G is monotone then Shδi (N, v) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
We end this section by discussing adaptations of two well-known monotonicity axioms. For
δ ∈ [0, 1], solution ψ
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• satisﬁes δ-monotonicity if ψi(N, v) ≥ ψi(N,w) for every pair of games (N, v), (N,w)
and i ∈ N such that v(S ∪ {i})− w(S ∪ {i}) ≥ δ(v(S)− w(S)) for all S ⊆ N \ {i}.
• satisﬁes coalitional δ-equivalence if for every pair of games (N, v), (N,w) ∈ G it holds
that ψi(N, v + w) = ψi(N, v) whenever i is a δ-reducing player in (N,w).
Taking δ = 1 in δ-monotonicity yields strong monotonicity of Young (1985), while taking
δ = 1 in coalitional δ-equivalence yields coalitional strategic equivalence of Chun (1992).
Taking δ = 0 in these two axioms yields coalitional monotonicity , respectively coalitional
standard equivalence, see van den Brink (2007).
We can easily generalize the results of Young (1985) and Chun (1992).11
Theorem 3.5 Let δ ∈ [0, 1]. Then
(i) a solution ψ satisfies efficiency, symmetry and δ-monotonicity if and only if ψ = Shδ.
(ii) a solution ψ satisfies efficiency, symmetry and coalitional δ-equivalence if and only if
ψ = Shδ.
Proof
It is easy to verify that Shδ satisﬁes eﬃciency, symmetry, δ-monotonicity and coalitional
δ-equivalence. Since δ-monotonicity implies coalitional δ-equivalence, for uniqueness we
only have to prove uniqueness in (ii). Therefore, suppose that solution ψ satisﬁes the three
axioms of (ii). Now, we show uniqueness by induction on d(v) = |{T ⊆ N | Dδv(T ) 
= 0}|
(in a similar way as in Young (1985) and Chun (1992) for the Shapley value and in van
den Brink (2007) for the equal division solution).
If d(v) = 0, then (N, v) is a null game and eﬃciency and symmetry imply that
ψi(N, v) = 0 = Sh
δ
i (N, v) for all i ∈ N .
Proceeding by induction, assume that ψi(N,w) = Sh
δ
i (N,w) if d(w) < d(v). Let
H(v) = {i ∈ N | Dδv(T ) = 0 for all T ⊆ N \ {i}}. For every i ∈ N \ H(v) there
exists a T ⊆ N \ {i} such that Dδv(T ) 
= 0. Coalitional δ-equivalence and the induction
hypothesis imply that ψi(N, v) = ψi(N, v −Dδv(T )d
δ
T ) = Sh
δ
i (N, v −D
δ
v(T )d
δ
T ) = Sh
δ
i (N, v)
for i ∈ N \ H(v) and T ⊆ N \ {i}. With symmetry and eﬃciency it then follows that
ψi(N, v) =
v(N)−
∑
j∈N\H(v) Sh
δ
j (N,v)
|H(v)| = Sh
δ
i (N, v) for i ∈ H(v). 
11Also the axiomatization of van den Brink (2001) by eﬃciency, fairness and the null player property
can be generalized, but the proof is more tedious and therefore deleted.
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4 Implementation
Before we give a strategic implementation of the solutions Shδ, we provide a recursive
formula that generalizes that of Maschler and Owen (1989) for the Shapley value, which is
given by
Shi(N, v) =
v(N)− v(N \ {i})
n
+
1
n
 ∑
j∈N\{i}
Shi(N \ {j}, v)
 for all i ∈ N. (4.1)
Theorem 4.1 For every δ ∈ [0, 1], (N, v) ∈ G and i ∈ N , it holds that
Shδi (N, v) =
v(N)− δv(N \ {i})
n
+
δ
n
 ∑
j∈N\{i}
Shδi (N \ {j}, v)

Proof
Take δ ∈ [0, 1] and (N, v) ∈ G. If |N | = 1 then the statement of the theorem is obviously
true since Shδi (N, v) = v({i}) in that case. Proceeding by induction, suppose that the
statement is true for all (N ′, v) ∈ G with |N ′| < |N |. It has been shown by Driessen and
Radzik (2002) that the solutions Shδ can be obtained by applying the Shapley value to the
modiﬁed game wδ given by wδ(S) = δn−sv(S), S ⊆ N , i.e. for every δ ∈ [0, 1] it holds that
Shδ(N, v) = Sh(N,wδ). (4.2)
With (4.1) it then follows that
Shδi (N, v) = Shi(N,w
δ)
=
wδ(N)− wδ(N \ {i})
n
+
δ
n
 ∑
j∈N\{i}
Shi(N \ {j}, w
δ)

=
v(N)− δv(N \ {i})
n
+
δ
n
 ∑
j∈N\{i}
Shδi (N \ {j}, v)
 .

We obtain the recursive formula of Maschler and Owen (1989) by taking δ = 1. In prov-
ing the implementation later in this section we also use a modified balanced contributions
property stating that for any game (N, v), and for all i, j ∈ N with i 
= j,
Shδi (N, v)− δSh
δ
i (N \ {j}, vN\{j}) = Sh
δ
j(N, v)− δSh
δ
j(N \ {i}, vN\{i}). (4.3)
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This follows straightforward from (4.2) and the balanced contributions property of Myerson
(1980), which is obtained by taking δ = 1.12
Next, we provide a non-cooperative (strategic) implementation of the δ-discounted Shapley
values. In the literature various implementations of the Shapley value can be found, see
e.g. Gul (1989), Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) and Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001). In
this paper we modify the bidding mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001). This
bidding mechanism proceeds in rounds, where each round consists of four stages. In the
ﬁrst stage of round 1, all players make bids to each other and the player with the highest
net bid (being the diﬀerence between the sum of all bids made to the other players and
the sum of all bids received from the other players) is chosen to be the proposer in stage
2 (where ties are broken by assigning each of the players with highest net bid to be the
proposer with equal probability). The ‘winner’ of this bidding pays the other players the
bids that it oﬀered. In the second stage the proposer makes a proposal (i.e. proposes a
payoﬀ) to every other player. In stage 3 the other players, sequentially, accept or reject
the proposal. The proposal is accepted if all other players accept, and is rejected if at
least one other player rejects it. In stage 4, if the proposal is accepted the players are paid
the proposed payoﬀs (additional to the bids made by the proposer in stage 1), and if the
proposal is rejected then the proposer leaves the game and receives its own singleton worth
(from which it has to pay the bids made in stage 1) while the other players go to the next
round to bid and bargain over their worth v(N \ α1), where α1 is the proposer in the ﬁrst
round.
This second round has the same four stages as the ﬁrst round (but with n − 1
players). The game proceeds untill at some round all remaining players accept the oﬀer by
the proposer or, after a sequence of rejections, round n is reached in which there is only
one player who just gets its singleton worth (plus all the net bids it received in all the ﬁrst
stages of all rounds). Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) showed that, if the cooperative
TU-game (N, v) is zero-monotonic, then the payoﬀs in any subgame perfect equilibrium of
this extensive form game are equal to the Shapley value of (N, v).
In this bidding mechanism there is no discounting. After rejection of the proposal
in the ﬁrst round, in the next round the remaining players bid for the worth v(N \ i∗1),
and so on. In this section we modify this bidding mechanism by discounting the worths to
be distributed each time a proposal is rejected and the players move to a next round, by
factor δ ∈ [0, 1].
12By the Shapley value satisfying the balanced contributions property of Myerson (1980), it follows
that Shδi (N, v)− δSh
δ
i (N \ {j}, vN\{j}) = Shi(N,w
δ)− δShi(N \ {j}, δ−1wδN\{j}) = Shj(N,w
δ)− Shj(N \
{i}, wδN\{i}) = Shj(N,w
δ) − Shj(N \ {i}, w
δ
N\{i}) = Sh
δ
j(N, v) − δSh
δ
j(N \ {i}, vN\{i}), where the ﬁrst
equality follows since wδN\{i}(S) = δ
n−1−sv(S) = δ−1wδ(S) for all S ⊆ N \ {i}.
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To formally describe the bidding mechanism, let Nt be the player set of the game
with which each round t ∈ {1, ..., n} will start, so N1 = N . For T ⊂ N the restricted game
(T, vT ) ∈ G is given by vT (S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ T .
The bidding mechanism
Round t, t ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} :
Stage 1: Each player i ∈ Nt makes bids bij ∈ R for every j 
= i. For each i ∈ Nt, let
Bi =
∑
j∈Nt\{i}
(
bij − b
j
i
)
, be the net bid of player i. Let αt be the player with
the highest net bid of round t. (In case of a non-unique maximizer we choose
any of these maximal bidders to be the ‘winner’ with equal probability.) Once
αt has been chosen, player αt pays every other player j ∈ Nt\{αt}, its oﬀered
bid bαtj . Player αt becomes the proposer in the next stage. Go to Stage 2.
Stage 2: Player αt proposes an oﬀer y
αt
j ∈ R to every player j ∈ Nt \ {αt}. (This
oﬀer is additional to the bids paid at stage 1.) Go to Stage 3.
Stage 3: The players other than αt, sequentially, either accept or reject the oﬀer. If
at least one player rejects it, then the oﬀer is rejected. Otherwise, the oﬀer is
accepted. Go to Stage 4.
Stage 4: If the oﬀer is accepted, then each player j ∈ Nt\{αt} receives y
αt
j and player
αt obtains the remainder δ
t−1v(Nt)−
∑
j∈Nt\{αt}
yαtj of the discounted payoﬀ at
this stage in Round t. Hence, in this case the ﬁnal payoﬀ to player j ∈ Nt \{αt}
is yαtj + b
αt
j +
∑t−1
k=1 b
αk
j , while player αt receives δ
t−1v(Nt) −
∑
j∈Nt\{αt}
(yαtj +
bαtj ) +
∑t−1
k=1 b
αk
αt
. Stop.
If the oﬀer is rejected then player αt leaves the game and obtains its stand-
alone payoﬀ δt−1v({αt}), while the players in Nt\{αt} proceed to round t+1 to
bargain over δtv(Nt\{αt}).
Round n : Nn = Nn−1\{αn−1}. Since Nn is a singleton coalition it is a one-player
(sub)game in this round. The game immediately stops such that player i ∈ Nn gets
its discounted stand-alone payoﬀ δn−1v(Nn). Its ﬁnal payoﬀ thus is δ
n−1v(Nn) +∑n−1
k=1 b
αk
i .
As mentioned above, Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) showed that for δ = 1 this bid-
ding mechanism implements the Shapley value for zero-monotonic games. It turns out that
this mechanism with discounting implements the corresponding δ-discounted Shapley value
as subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome if the original TU-game is δ-monotonic
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meaning that v(S) ≥ δv(S \ {i})+ v({i}) for all S ⊆ N and all i ∈ S.13 Zero-monotonicity
then is obtained by taking δ = 1. Note that for nonnegative games (i.e. v(S) ≥ 0 for all
S ⊆ N), δ-monotonicity is weaker than zero-monotonicity for every δ ∈ (0, 1]14 and thus
also weaker than superadditivity. Thus, the implementation also holds if we just require
the game to be nonnegative and zero-monotonic for all δ ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 4.2 Let δ ∈ [0, 1], and let (N, v) ∈ G be a δ-monotonic game. Then the outcome
in any subgame perfect equilibrium of the bidding mechanism coincides with the payoff
vector Shδ(N, v).
Proof
The proof follows the lines of the proof of the implementation of the Shapley value in
Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) (Theorem 1), and therefore we only mention the
diﬀerences. First, Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) construct a strategy proﬁle that is
an SPE in their bidding game and yields the Shapley value payoﬀs as outcomes. In this
strategy proﬁle, in all actions of player i we discount the part that is based on payoﬀs in
restricted games on the set of players without the proposer αt (in the bidding in stage 1,
the proposals in stage 2 if i is the proposer, and what proposals i will accept in stage 3
if i is not the proposer), i.e. in round t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} we just replace φj(Nt \ {i}) by
δφj(Nt \ {i}) and replace φi(Nt \ {j}) by δφi(Nt \ {j}).
15 All net bids being zero can be
shown using the modiﬁed balanced contributions (4.3) instead of balanced contributions.
Checking that the corresponding strategies yield an SPE goes similar as in Pe´rez-
Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), but under the condition of δ-monotonicity.
Then, Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) show that any SPE yields the Shapley
value payoﬀs by a series of claims. Claim (a) states that in any SPE all players i 
= αt
that are not proposer in round t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} accept the oﬀer of proposer αt if that
is greater than their payoﬀ φi(Nt \ {αt}), and the oﬀer is rejected if at least one of those
players i 
= αt gets an oﬀer smaller than φi(Nt \ {αt}). We just discount the payoﬀs on
the player set Nt \ {αt} by multiplying these payoﬀs by δ, i.e. replacing φi(Nt \ {αt}) by
δφi(Nt \ {αt}).
Claim (b) states that if v(Nt) > v(Nt\{αt})+v({αt}), the only SPE of the (sub)game
that starts at stage 2 is such that the proposer oﬀers φi(Nt \ {αt}) to all i 
= αt, and at
13We remark that under the alternative condition v(S) ≥ δ(v(S \ {i})+v({i})) in stage 4 of the bidding
mechanism we could allow proposer αt in round t to obtain δ
tv(αt) if its proposal is rejected.
14For any pair of discount factors δ, δ′ ∈ [0, 1] with δ < δ′, a nonnegative game is δ-monotonic if it is
δ′-monotonic.
15Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) shorten payoﬀs φi(T, vT ) by φi(T ) for T ⊂ N . Also, they use
the notation N for the player set in any subgame, while in our notation N refers to the full player set, and
subgames are played on subsets Nt in round t ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
12
stage 3 every player i 
= αt accepts any oﬀer greater or equal than φi(Nt \ {αt}) and
rejects all smaller oﬀers. Again we simply discount the payoﬀs of restricted games and
replace φi(Nt \ {αt}) by δφi(Nt \ {αt}). Using δ-monotonicity, this claim is shown if
v(Nt) > δv(Nt \ {αt}) + v({αt}), i.e. we also discount the surplus v(Nt \ {αt}). (Also in
the proof of this claim everywhere we replace v(Nt \ {αt}) by δv(Nt \ {αt}).
Claim (c) of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) states that in any SPE, the net
bids of all players are equal, and therefore equal to zero. For this claim discounting is not
relevant, and for our mechanism this is proved in the same way16.
Claim (d) of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) states that in any SPE, each
player’s payoﬀ is the same regardless who is chosen as the proposer. Also the proof of this
claim does not need discounting, and is identical for all discounted Shapley values.
Finally Claim (e), stating that in any SPE the ﬁnal payoﬀ received by each of
the players coincides with their Shapley value, uses Maschler and Owen (1989)’s recursive
formula for the Shapley value (see (4.1)). Discounting the payoﬀ v(Nt\{i}) by δv(Nt\{i}),
we can apply Theorem 4.1 to obtain a similar result for any discounted Shapley value.
This completes the proof17. 
In the bidding mechanism above we presented the parameter δ as a discount factor
which determines the discounting of the available worth going from one round of nego-
tiation to the next after a rejection of the proposal. Alternatively, the parameter δ can
be interpreted as a probability of breakdown of the negotiations after a rejection. In van
den Brink, Funaki and Ju (2007) the mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001)
is adapted to obtain a two-level bidding mechanism implementing any egalitarian Shapley
value, i.e. any convex combination of the Shapley value and equal division solution. This
modiﬁcation concerns a possibility of breakdown of the negotiations after rejection of the
proposal only in the ﬁrst round of the negotiations. After that the mechanism is the same
as that of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), so there is no possibility of breakdown
anymore. This kind of breakdown may occur, for example, when the players do not know
each other and speak diﬀerent languages. Then it might be that after rejection in the ﬁrst
round they decide that they cannot communicate and bargain with each other. But if they
agree that they can bargain together then they will bargain untill they reach an agreement
or only one player is left.
16In the proof of this claim in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) the player j 
∈ Ω should be one with
the highest net bid among those not in Ω, where Ω is the set of players in N with the highest net bid.
17A fully detailed proof can be obtained from the authors on request.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have characterized the δ-discounted Shapley values by replacing the null-,
respectively, nullifying player property that are used in characterizations of the Shapley
value, respectively, the equal division solution, by the δ-reducing player property (with the
null- and nullifying player properties as special cases).
As a second characterization, we modiﬁed the bidding mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo
and Wettstein (2001) implementing the Shapley value, by allowing discounting of the
worths to be distributed after every rejection of the proposal with a uniform discount
factor δ, so that the payoﬀs in all subgame perfect equilibiria of the bidding game coincide
with the corresponding δ-discounted Shapley value.
We already mentioned in Section 2 that Joosten (1996) showed that for any δ ∈ [0, 1]
the corresponding δ-discounted Shapley value is characterized by Hart and Mas-Colell
consistency and δ-standardness for two player games. To be precize, a solution ψ
• satisﬁes HM-consistency if ψi(N, v) = ψi(T, v
ψ
T ) for every (N, v) ∈ G, T ⊆ N , and
i ∈ T , where the reduced game (T, vψT ) is given by v
ψ
T (S) = v(S∪T
c)−
∑
j∈T c ψj(S∪
T c, vS∪T c) for all S ⊆ T with T c = N \ T .
• satisﬁes δ-standardness for two-player games, δ ∈ [0, 1], if for every (N, v) ∈ G with
N = {i, j}, i 
= j, it holds that ψi(N, v) = δv({i}) +
1
2
(v(N)− δ(v({i}) + v({j}))).
Speciﬁc choices of δ ∈ [0, 1] give diﬀerent versions of standardness for two-player
games as encountered in the literature. Taking δ = 1 yields standardness for two-player
games as considered in, e.g. Hart and Mas-Colell (1988, 1989): ψi(N, v) = v({i}) +
1
2
(v(N)− v({i})− v({j})) with N = {i, j}. Taking δ = 0, yields egalitarian standardness
for two-player games: ψi(N, v) =
1
2
v(N) for i ∈ N . As a corollary from Joosten (1996,
Proposition 5.32), and Theorem 3.2 we thus obtain that a solution satisﬁes eﬃciency,
symmetry, linearity and the δ-reducing player property if and only if it satisﬁes HM-
consistency and δ-standardness for two-player games.
To compare, in van den Brink, Ju and Funaki (2007) it is shown that each egal-
itarian Shapley value (i.e. convex combination of the Shapley value and equal division
solution) satisﬁes Sobolev (1973)’s reduced game consistency. In fact, they show that each
egalitarian Shapley value is characterized by Sobolev’s consistency and the corresponding
δ-standardness for two-player games.
At the end of the previous section we already remarked that the egalitarian Shapley
values can be implemented by applying discounting (or possibility of breakdown of the
negotiations) only in the ﬁrst round, while in this paper it is shown that the discounted
Shapley values are implemented by applying discounting in every period. One plan for
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future research is to consider what classes of solutions are obtained by a strategic imple-
mentation but where discounting is applied only in the ﬁrst k ∈ {2, . . . n− 1} rounds.
We end by considering the duals of the δ-discounted Shapley values. The dual game
of game (N, v) is the game (N, v∗) given by v∗(N) = v(N) − v(N \ S) for all S ⊆ N .
Instead of looking what coalition S can earn, the dual of a game considers what the
‘grand coalition’ N looses when coalition S does not cooperate with the other players
anymore. The dual of a solution ψ is the solution ψ∗(N, v) = ψ(N, v∗) for all (N, v) ∈ G.
A solution ψ is self-dual if ψ∗(N, v) = ψ(N, v) for all (N, v) ∈ G. It is known that
the Shapley value and the equal division solution are self-dual. For δ ∈ [0, 1], denoting
ŵδ(S) = δn−sv∗(S) = δn−s(v(N) − v(N \ S)) for all S ⊆ N , its dual game is ŵδ
∗
(S) =
ŵδ(N)− ŵδ(N \S) = δn−nv(N)− δn−n+s(v(N)− v(S)) = (1− δs)v(N)+ δsv(S). Denoting
v(S) = (1− δs)v(N) and v˜(S) = δsv(S) for all S ⊆ N , we have
Shδ
∗
i (N, v) = Sh
δ
i (N, v
∗) = Shi(N, ŵδ) = Shi(N, v) + Shi(N, v˜)
=
1− δn
n
v(N) +
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
(
δs+1v(S ∪ {i})− δsv(S)
)
=
1− δn
n
v(N) +
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
δs (δv(S ∪ {i})− v(S)) for all i ∈ N.
Studying the dual class of δ-discounted Shapley values is also a plan for future research.
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